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Abstract 
This paper explores the relationship between emerging technology-enabled behaviors and established 
copyright law in the United States.  Challenges implicated by recent technological developments have 
given rise to a consensus among policy-makers, scholars, public interest advocates, and various other 
stakeholders that copyright reforms are needed.  Debates over what shape the potential reforms ought to 
take have been strident, unrelenting, and seemingly paralyzing to the cause.  Meanwhile, courts have 
continued to adjudicate cases testing the balance between existing copyright doctrines and new methods 
of creating, managing, and sharing protected works.  The paper describes a recent exemplar involving 
mass digitization, Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, and critically reflects upon the courts’ fair use analyses 
before articulating an emerging theoretical framework for understanding and explaining the intersection of 
copyright law and technological change based on the sociological concept of innovative deviance. 
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Since the enactment of the Statute of Anne over three centuries ago, copyright laws have struggled to 
maintain functionality, credibility, and relevance in the face of technological change.  Although its grant is 
limited to “original works of authorship” and technological inventions and other useful articles are 
expressly excluded from its purview (17 U.S.C. §102), copyright law is nevertheless implicated in the 
ways we design and implement technologies to create, interact with, and share the cultural and 
intellectual works it is intended to foster.  While copyright law provides a regulatory framework intended to 
stimulate the progress of science and the useful arts  (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8), a more realistic 
assessment might suggest that the true, unacknowledged legislators of the world are technologists (P. 
Duguid (personal communication, Jan. 16, 2014) citing Shelley, 1890, p. 46).  How might we better 
understand the complex, often murky, relationship between copyright law and technological change? And 
how should courts and lawmakers respond to technology-enabled behaviors that seem both socially 
beneficial and infringing under existing law? 
This research contemplates tensions arising at the intersection of copyright law and technological 
change and envisions an emerging theoretical framework based upon sociological theories of deviance. 
Beginning with some general observations on the relationship between copyright law and new 
technologies, the introduction identifies and describes some of the key policy challenges in this area.  
Section two considers judicial applications and adaptations of existing fair use doctrine to emerging, 
arguably deviant, technology-enabled copyright-related behavior leading to an in-depth discussion of an 
exemplar, HathiTrust’s mass digitization project.  Finally, section three engages sociological literature on 
technological change and deviance and begins to articulate a theoretical framework for re-conceptualizing 
the interplay between copyright law and emerging technology based upon social disorganization theory 
and Robert Merton’s concept of innovative deviance. By offering a glimpse into the phenomenon via this 
new lens, this research hopes to deepen understandings of the relationship between copyright law and 
technological innovation, and enrich existing discourse on this topic, particularly with respect to mass 
digitization. 
1 Introduction 
Under U.S. law, copyright is a creature of the state, “not an inevitable, divine, or natural right that confers 
on authors the absolute ownership of their creations.  It is designed rather to stimulate activity and 
progress in the arts for the intellectual enrichment of the public” by granting authors a limited monopoly 
over their original creations. (Leval, 1990, p.1107)  The philosophical underpinnings of the current system 
are thus based on the utilitarian tenet of maximizing net social welfare. (Fisher, 2001; Merges, 2011) 
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Copyright’s means-end formulation, which presupposes that people may be disinclined to create or 
innovate unless rewarded with a concomitant right to exploit the fruits of their labor, has deep historical 
roots.  For example, we see precursors as far back as the Leviathan (1651) where, in laying out his social 
contract theory, Hobbes famously argued that “there is no place for industry” in a lawless world “because 
the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; … no account of Time; no Arts; no 
Letters; no Society.” (Hobbes & Tuck, 1996, p. 89)  A few short decades later, England enacted the 
world’s first copyright law, commonly called “The Statute of Anne” (1710), and it too was based on an 
essentially identical premise, plainly evident from its official title: “An Act for the Encouragement of 
Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the 
Times therein mentioned.”  
Implicit in the law’s means-end formulation, however, is the assumption that methods of 
reproduction and dissemination are costly.  While this may have been the case in centuries or decades 
past, the premise no longer holds true.  Technological developments including the advent of the Internet, 
the creation of technical protocols and standards, and improvements in digitization now enable content to 
be moved rapidly, at relatively low cost, and without significant degradation.  Changes in information 
technology have consequently altered copyright-related behaviors and norms in fundamental ways. New 
methods of creating, organizing, managing, disseminating, and engaging with existing works have 
emerged. As these behaviors increasingly supplant traditionally sanctioned means of creation and 
innovation, questions and concerns arise regarding the propriety and lawfulness of emerging behaviors 
as well as the existing copyright regime’s ability to effectively regulate them amidst rapid technological 
change. (National Research Council, 2013)   
Recent developments in information technology abet a miscalibration of the law made manifest 
through the new, often transgressive, copyright-related behaviors they enable; this miscalibration has, in 
turn, generated a flurry of interest in copyright reform.  Maria Pallante, the Register of Copyrights, recently 
observed: “The copyright world, which once had predictable and even pristine demarcations, has 
morphed dramatically” as a result of recent technological developments and, on this basis, “some 
recalibrations” of the existing legal framework may be required (2012(a), p. 339; 2012(b)).  In last few 
years the Copyright Office has solicited requests for comment, held roundtables, and released reports on 
a range of issues including, for example, the copyright implications of mass digitization (U.S. Copyright 
Office, 2011).  Additionally, in 2013, the Department of Commerce’s Internet Policy Task Force released 
a report on Copyright Policy, Creativity, and Innovation in the Digital Economy and the National Research 
Council released a report on Copyright in the Digital Era: Building Evidence for Policy. In 2014, the 
Berkeley Center for Law and Technology hosted “The Next Great Copyright Act,” a symposium at which 
Pallante delivered a keynote calling for comprehensive copyright reform.  Consensus is building among 
academics, policy-makers, and stakeholders that legal reforms are a necessary response to recent 
technological changes.   
Despite consensus that reforms are needed, there is much disagreement around what shape 
potential reforms should take.  Rights holders and their advocates characterize copyright’s miscalibration 
as under-restrictive and complain that existing laws fail to effectively prohibit a host of activities which 
seem neither to respect the limited monopoly of rights holders nor stimulate artistic creativity for the 
common good.  Readers, users, and public interest advocates on the other hand characterize the 
miscalibration as over-restrictive and argue that existing laws prohibit behaviors that promote the purpose 
of copyright at little to no observable detriment to rights holders.  Innovative technologists are concerned 
that intellectual, creative, and technological potential might be unnecessarily restricted by hidebound 
copyright laws seemingly bent on over-rewarding the incumbent beneficiaries of a prior technical regime 
at the expense of new-comers.  Members of established industries meanwhile caution that the law’s 
miscalibration introduces uncertainty into the system of cultural production, consumption, and 
participation, making it difficult for stakeholders to assess risks and make sound economic decisions.   
The numerous and vociferous participants in current copyright policy debates have done little to 
help elucidate a policy solution for the challenges posed by recent technological developments.  In fact, 
the current discourse, plagued by partisan discord, may be undermining the possibility of finding a 
solution more than facilitating it: “[T]hese disruptive changes have given rise to a strident debate” in the 
public discourse around copyright reform, characterized by “rhetorical excess,” a “climate of 
recrimination,” and “an unwillingness to engage in rational discourse” over copyright law’s proper scope 
and role with respect to technological innovation and creative expression. (Samuelson, 2010; National 
Research Council, 2013)  Compounding the problem, the debate is poorly informed by independent 
empirical research: “Instead of asking, ‘What is the research-based evidence?’ partisans tend to rely on 
claims of and evidence marshaled by stakeholders.” (National Research Council, 2013, p. 2)  This tactic 
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has been described by one commentator as “stirring up moral panics” intended to short-circuit critical 
thinking on copyright issues and undermine participants’ ability to identify and evaluate the real issues at 
stake in copyright policy debates over new technologies and emerging copyright-related behaviors. 
(Patry, 2009)   
While comprehensive copyright reform of the kind advocated by Pallante and others may be 
stymied by the unrelenting tumult of copyright policy debates, courts continue to consider and adjudicate 
disputes in this area.  The following section explores one particular collision involving copyright and 
technological change and considers the promise and challenges of judicial recalibration of copyright law 
by stretching an existing doctrine, fair use, to fit the contours of an emerging technology-enabled 
behavior, mass digitization. 
2 Fair Use and HathiTrust’s Mass Digitization Project (“MDP”) 
 
2.1  Existing Fair Use Doctrine 
The doctrine of fair use serves as an important limitation on an author’s exclusive rights by allowing “the 
public to draw upon copyrighted materials without the permission of the copyright holder in certain 
circumstances” (Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 95 (2nd Cir. 2014)).  As the Supreme Court 
commented, fair use is essential to the Act’s overriding goal:   
 
“From the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted 
materials has been thought necessary to fulfill copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts …’” (Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. at 
574 (1994)).  
 
Fair use requires a court to weigh together four nonexclusive factors in assessing whether a 
particular use is fair (17 U.S.C. §107):  (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted 
work, including whether it is primarily creative or instructive (which copyright tends to value and seek to 
foster) or primarily factual (in which the law of fair use recognizes a greater need to disseminate); (3) the 
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, including 
whether the secondary use employed no more than was necessary to effectuate any valid purpose under 
the first factor; and (4) the effect of the use upon the market for or value of the copyrighted work.  
Some examples of fair use arising from prior litigation include: 
 
• Book reviewers and biographers quoting from an original work in order to illustrate a point and 
substantiate criticism (Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass 1841); Wright v. Warner 
Books, Inc., 953 F. 2d 731 (2nd Cir. 1991)); 
• Artists using copyrighted photographs in a new work that uses a fundamentally different artistic 
approach, aesthetic, and character from the original (Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706 (2nd Cir. 
2013)); 
• Internet search engines displaying low-resolution thumbnails of copyrighted images in order to 
direct users to the website hosting the original (Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 
1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818-822 (9th Cir. 2002)); 
• Viewers recording a television broadcast for later viewing (Sony Corp. of Am. V. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447-450 (1984)); 
• Competitor copying protected software for purposes of reverse engineering (Sony Comp. 
Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 599-601 (2000)); 
• Company digitizing unaltered student essays for use in connection with plagiarism detection 
software (A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 639-640 (2009)). 
 
Driven by a concern that fair use cases were too often “adjudicated upon ad hoc perceptions of 
justice without a permanent framework,” Judge Pierre Leval first proposed “transformation” as a cogent 
governing principle for fair use determinations in his seminal article, Toward a Fair Use Standard (1990).  
The landmark case, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (1994), was the first time the Supreme Court 
applied a transformation analysis to a fair use determination and, since that decision, courts have 
increasingly focused on whether the purpose and character of a secondary use is transformative: 
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“A use is transformative if it does something more than repackage or republish the 
original copyrighted work.  The inquiry is whether the work ‘adds something new, with a 
further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or 
message …’” (Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 2014, p. 96 quoting Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose, 1994, p. 579 citing Leval, 1990, p. 1111).    
 
2.2  Description of the Mass Digitization Project (“MDP”) 
Beginning in 2004, several major research libraries agreed to allow Google to digitally copy books in their 
collections as part of Google’s Library Project, one piece of the larger Google Books Project.  The specific 
terms of the agreements varied by institution and most remain cloaked under conditions of confidentiality 
however, based on Google’s agreement with the University of Michigan1, made public under that state’s 
freedom of information laws, we know Google scanned that library’s books, gave the library a digital copy 
(consisting of both an image file and text file), and retained an identical digital copy for inclusion in its own 
searchable electronic database (UM-Google cooperative agreement, 2004).   As a result of significant 
technical advances in optical character recognition, indexing, and search algorithm design, Google 
generated high-quality machine-readable, fully indexed and searchable texts from print materials at a 
scale previously unmatched.  The Library Project also signaled an important re-contextualization of the 
role of academic research libraries with respect to the ways in which cultural and intellectual works are 
managed, organized, and shared, experienced, studied, and understood.       
In 2008, thirteen universities launched HathiTrust, a partnership united around the common goal 
of ensuring that the cultural record (primarily vis-à-vis the Google scans) is preserved and accessible.  As 
of January 1st, 2015, the HathiTrust Digital Library (“HDL”) has over 100 partner institutions and a corpus 
of over 13 million volumes.  38% of HDL’s total volumes are known to be in the public domain and digital 
copies of these works are made available to HathiTrust members and visitors to the HDL website.  
HathiTrust treats the remaining more than 8 million in-copyright volumes differently 
(http://www.hathitrust.org).  
HathiTrust permits three uses of the copyrighted works in the HDL.  First, all visitors to the HDL 
website are allowed to conduct full-text searches of the entire corpus.  If a work is in-copyright and the 
copyright holder has not authorized broader use, the search results show only the page numbers 
containing the search term and its frequency per page.  Unlike Google’s service, HDL does not display 
any text or “snippets” from the underlying copyrighted work.  Second, HathiTrust member institutions can 
opt-in to HDL’s enhanced access for patrons with certified print disabilities which makes the entire corpus 
(public domain and in-copyright works) readable via adaptive technologies.  Third, HathiTrust permits 
members to create a replacement copy of a work for purposes of preservation in accordance with §108 of 
the Act (Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F.Supp.2d 445, 458 (Dist. Court, S.D.N.Y. 2012).   
 
2.3  Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust 
In September, 2011, twenty authors and authors’ associations (“Authors Guild”) sued HathiTrust, Cornell 
University, and the presidents of the Universities of Michigan, California, Wisconsin, and Indiana 
University (“HathiTrust”) for copyright infringement, asserting that the systematic digitization of 
copyrighted materials without authorization violates authors’ exclusive rights. (17 U.S.C. §106)  
HathiTrust conceded that the Authors Guild established a prima facie case of infringement with respect to 
certain works but defended its activities on the basis of fair use. 
 
2.3.1 District Court decision 
The district court ruled in HathiTrust’s favor, finding that the three uses HathiTrust permitted with respect 
to the HDL were transformative fair uses.  The court’s rationale was primarily motivated by “the goal of 
copyright itself, whether ‘promoting the Progress of Science and useful Arts would be better served by 
allowing the use than by preventing it’” (Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 2012).  After acknowledging that 
central purpose of the transformative use analysis is to determine “whether the new work merely 
supersede[s] the objects of the original creation … or instead adds something new, with a further purpose 
or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message” the court concluded 
HathiTrust’s uses were transformative “because the copies serve an entirely different purpose than the 
originals” citing HDL’s full-text search’s enabling of “new methods of academic inquiry such as text 
mining” as an example (Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 2012, p. 459-460).   
                                                       
1 University of Michigan was one of the original “Google Five” partner institutions in the Library Project and was the lead architect of 
HathiTrust. 
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The district court’s fair use analysis ends on a somewhat unusual note, transitioning from the 
dispassionate and impartial rhetoric characteristic of most court opinions to Judge Baer’s personal, 
almost confessional, reflections on the case: 
 
“Although I recognize that the facts here may on some levels be without precedent, I am 
convinced that they fall safely within the protection of fair use (…).  I cannot imagine a definition 
of fair use that would not encompass the transformative uses made by Defendants’ MDP and 
would require that I terminate this invaluable contribution to the progress of science and 
cultivation of the arts that at the same time effectuates the ideals espoused by the ADA” (Authors 
Guild v. HathiTrust, 2012, p. at 464) [emphasis added]. 
  
2.3.2 Circuit Court decision 
The Authors Guild appealed and the second circuit affirmed the district court’s holding with respect to full-
text search and improved access for print-disabled individuals; they were deemed fair uses.  (The court 
vacated the lower court’s holding with respect to preservation because it found that the Authors Guild 
lacked standing to bring the claim (Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 2014, p. 104)).  Despite reaching the 
same ultimate result with regard to the HDL’s full-text search, the court disagreed with the lower court’s 
transformation analysis:  
 
“Contrary to what the district court implied, a use does not become transformative by making an 
‘invaluable contribution to the progress of science and cultivation of the arts.’  Added value or 
utility is not the test: a transformative work is one that serves a new and different function from 
the original work and is not a substitute for it” (Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 2014, p. 96 quoting 
Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 2012, p. 464).   
 
The court then concluded that the creation of a full-text searchable database is a “quintessentially 
transformative use” because the results of the search are “different in purpose, character, expression, 
meaning, and message” from the original work from which it is drawn (Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 2014, 
p. 97).   
Likewise, the court took issue with the lower court’s transformation analysis with respect to HDL’s 
improved access for print-disabled patrons: “providing expanded access … is not ‘transformative’” 
because it does not “add something new to the copyrighted work” (Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 2014, p. 
101).  Furthermore, the court concluded that HDL’s purpose in improving access was no different from 
the purpose of the original works; transformation requires more than simply enabling a new audience to 
read a book.  While the court declined to find HDL’s improved access transformative, it nevertheless 
found it to be a non-infringing fair use because HDL took no more than was necessary to effectuate its 
valid purpose and did not harm the potential market for the original because, sadly, the virtual non-
existence of a market for handicap-accessible books necessarily forecloses the possibility of harm.  
 
2.4  Discussion of the Case 
As a policy matter, Authors Guild v. HathiTrust reached the right result because the potential harm to the 
Authors Guild is minor and speculative compared to the tremendous benefits to the general public, as 
well as the grievously underserved print-disabled community, demonstrated by the HDL.  Also noteworthy 
is the care with which the judiciary considered the impact of new technology not just in terms of the three 
specific uses at issue in the case, but also in terms of how emerging technology-enabled behaviors are 
conceptualized within the framework provided by existing doctrines, precedent, and copyright’s overriding 
goal:  
 
“The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the 
general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors…When technological change 
has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be construed in light of this 
basic purpose” (Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 2012, p. 453-454).   
 
But this case also reflects the previously discussed miscalibration or mismatch between the goal 
of copyright law and the available means for achieving the goal under existing law.  The following sub-
sections address a few of the challenges and limitations inherent in the courts’ attempts to stretch existing 
doctrine to fit the contours of emerging technology-enabled behaviors. 
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2.4.1  Something New 
The first issue raised by the courts’ rationale in Authors Guild v. HathiTrust is essentially doctrinal:  HDL’s 
full-text search functionality fails to meet the “adds something new” requirement under traditional 
transformative use analysis.  HDL’s full-search function adds societal value because, as the courts noted, 
it can facilitate research particularly with respect to data-mining, but it achieves this functionality by 
masking off the entire contents of the protected work save the search terms provided by users and the 
relevant pages numbers.  It is not clear how this masking off alters the original works by adding “new 
expression, meaning, or message.”  Removing original expression seems to be the precise opposite of 
adding new expression.  Moreover, while users and data-miners may use the search results to 
subsequently generate new meaning or message or create information, insights, or understandings with 
respect to the original works, HDL’s search service does not.  Full-text search is a technological tool, 
albeit one that has tremendous value and use to society as the courts noted, but it does not transform the 
original works by adding something new as required by existing fair use doctrine.  The circuit court 
purported to corrected the district court’s analysis on this point when it noted that making an ‘invaluable 
contribution to the progress of science and cultivation of the arts” is not enough to transform an infringing 
use into a fair one.  A careful review of the circuit court’s own reason, however, casts doubt on whether it 
was ultimately able to push beyond the “value to society” rationale in a meaningful, doctrinally-supported 
way. 
 Supporting its decision, the court cited two transformative fair use decisions from other circuits.  
The first case found a search engine’s use of low-resolution thumbnail images to facilitate search 
functionality to be a fair use (Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, 2007). The second case found a company’s 
digitization of student essays for use in connection with anti-plagiarism detecting software to be a fair use 
(A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, 2009).  These cases are analogous to Authors Guild v. HathiTrust 
in the sense that each involves behavior that would constitute mass copyright infringement but for the 
application of a technological tool that, when combined with existing works, produces tremendous benefit 
to society despite failing to meet the “adding something new” requirement of traditional transformative fair 
use jurisprudence.   
These cases highlight a potentially important disconnect between the core transformative use 
cases, which deal with expressive or creative works, and an emerging sub-set of transformative use 
cases, which deal with the technical manipulation of existing works to enable the emergence of new facts 
and information about those works.  These are categorically and qualitatively distinct sorts of activities.  
When courts lump them together under a single rubric it may undermine jurisprudential clarity, 
transparency, and credibility, the very concerns that motivated Judge Leval’s articulation of the 
transformative use principle in the first place (1990).     
 
2.4.2  Scalability 
Another concern stemming from the courts’ reasoning in Authors Guild v. HathiTrust concerns issues of 
scalability.  The trio of cases just discussed give rise to a potentially troubling inference that these 
decisions may be custom-fit solutions only available to very large and/or powerful companies or 
organizations.  It is difficult to imagine how individual, small-scale, more modest, and/or more distributed 
endeavors combining copyright infringement with a new technological tool could satisfy the implicit 
requirement that the use result in a tremendous benefit to society.  If we agree, however, that society can 
and does benefit in important ways from the application of new technologies to existing cultural works (as 
these cases demonstrate), then it makes sense to treat individual, small-scale, more modest, and/or more 
distributed versions of this activity with a similar degree of deference, if not outright support.  It may be 
true that “quantity has a quality all its own,” but if courts limit the protections of fair use to massive scale 
projects like those of HathiTrust and Google, we risk losing out on the societal benefits resulting from less 
heroic, less visible, but still significant, endeavors. 
 
2.4.3  Implications Under Other Laws 
Related to this is the concern of what happens when it is not copyright law but some other set of legal 
rules that is applied to the activity.  In those instances, fair use would not be an option.  Take for example, 
the much publicized activity of Aaron Swartz.  Swartz entered a computer lab at MIT without permission 
and systematically downloaded a substantial portion of JSTOR’s archive.  It is not entirely clear what his 
intentions were but it is presumed that he planned to make the materials more widely accessible or, at the 
minimum, raise awareness around the issue of access to scholarly works.  As a result, the United States’ 
Department of Justice indicted him on two counts of wire fraud and eleven violations of the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act, carrying a cumulative maximum penalty of $1 million in fines and 35 years in 
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prison.  While those charges were ultimately dismissed after Swartz’s suicide two years later, the case 
highlights the fact that emerging technology-enabled activities are often not restricted to the copyright law 
domain.  There is no fair use defense to wire fraud or violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 
U.S.C. §1030).  Despite one’s views on Swartz’s particular activities, this example highlights society’s 
uncertain, evolving view of how to treat people who allegedly break the law by copying protected works 
“not to enrich themselves, but to make [the works] available to others.”  It is not clear that the existing 
legal regime offers a satisfactory response to this uncertainty (Associated Press, 2013).  This suggests 
that potential resolution of the phenomenon discussed herein will require a policy solution that is not 
strictly limited to copyright law but consists of a set of principles with broader applicability.  
3 Innovative Deviance: An Emerging Theoretical Framework 
Thus far, this paper has explored aspects of the complicated, often murky intersection between copyright 
law, technological change, and emerging behavior.  The paper discussed some of the broader policy 
concerns stemming from the widely-perceived miscalibration of copyright law’s means-end formulation 
and discussed judicial approaches to recalibration using existing fair use doctrine, focusing on a particular 
behavior, mass digitization, in the context of an exemplar case, Authors Guild v. HathiTrust.  Those 
sections illustrated the challenges and limitations inherent in attempts to stretch existing copyright laws -- 
premised on a past technical reality -- to fit the contours of emerging behaviors.  
In this section, the paper steps back from current policy debates and litigation around mass 
digitization to focus on the broader, somewhat paradoxical, phenomenon: changes in technology enable 
the emergence of new copyright-related behaviors that have the potential to promote the overriding goal 
of copyright through the use of unorthodox, illegitimate, and/or infringing means.  Engaging sociological 
literature on deviance, this section begins to articulate an emerging theoretical framework for 
understanding the interplay between copyright law, technological change, and emerging behavior based 
upon social disorganization and structural strain theory.  By offering a glimpse into the phenomenon via 
this new and different lens, this section hopes to expand our understanding phenomenon and potentially 
enrich existing discourse on copyright and technological change.  
 
3.1  Social Disorganization Theory 
Technological innovation has long been recognized by sociologists as a catalyst for transgressive or 
deviant behavior.  For example, in the 1920s the Chicago School posited that rapid technological change 
damages society’s web of normative controls resulting in normative dissensus and social disorganization. 
Over the short-term, these theorists argued that the natural by-product of social disorganization is 
deviance; people break the rules.  Over the long-term, deviance would be reclassified as “normative 
competition” which, in their view, should ultimately push society toward reorganization around new norms. 
(Pfohl, 1994)   
In the context of HathiTrust and mass digitization, social disorganization theory might suggest that 
the significant advances in information technology previously discussed, particularly with respect to 
network infrastructure development, the creation of standards and protocols, and improvements in 
digitization at scale, disrupted the functionality, credibility, and relevance of existing copyright rules 
governing how intellectual and creative works are created, shared, organized, and disseminated.  The 
possibilities inherent in digitization at scale fundamentally altered the context of institutional sensemaking 
and decision-making around copyright issues and led several major research institutions to engage in a 
mass digitization project that potentially exposed them to hundreds of millions of dollars in damages.  As 
the still-active litigations stemming from the Google Library Project can attest, we are still in the process of 
reorganizing the flux. 
 While social disorganization theory offers some insights into the relationship between 
technological change and deviance, one drawback is that it does not distinguish between kinds of 
deviance.  In particular, it makes no distinction between deviance that may be beneficial or productive for 
society versus non-utilitarian or destructive deviance.  A different but I would argue complimentary theory 
of deviance developed by Robert K. Merton in his 1938 book, Social Structure and Anomie, offers some 
additional insights on this point.   
 
3.2  Structural Strain Theory 
Instead of focusing on rapid technological change as the primary catalyst for deviance, Merton’s premise 
was that deviance is a natural by-product of structured inequalities in society, namely a mismatch 
between accepted cultural goals and the availability of legitimate means to accomplish those goals.  In 
the context of this research, copyright law’s means-end formulation can be understood as a structured 
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inequality in two senses.  First, the entire copyright system is, in essence, a structured inequality because 
based upon state created and sanctioned monopolies for authors in the cultural and intellectual works 
they create.  Second, and perhaps more importantly, the widely-perceived imbalance or miscalibration 
between the goal of copyright law and the means set forth to accomplish its goal also reflects a structured 
inequality for purposes of Merton’s theory.  
According to Merton, the mismatch between accepted cultural goals and the availability of 
legitimate means to accomplish those goals pushes people toward deviance along one of four possible 
paths: 
 
• Innovative deviance:  goals are accepted but legitimate means are rejected or unavailable; 
• Ritualistic deviance:  goals are rejected but legitimate means are accepted; 
• Retreatist deviance: goals are rejected and legitimate means are rejected or unavailable; 
• Rebellious deviance: both goals and means are rejected and “something better” is sought 
 
HathiTrust’s mass digitization project could be understood as an example of innovative deviance 
with respect to existing copyright law.  Its primary progenitor, the University of Michigan, sought to 
preserve, improve access to, and stimulate the creation of new intellectual and creative works by 
permitting the unauthorized digital reproduction of its vast print collection.  In essence, Michigan sought to 
advance the goal of copyright by engaging in an activity that potentially constituted mass copyright 
infringement. Although it was not referenced by the courts in the Authors Guild v. HathiTrust cases, 
Merton’s theoretical framework might help explain, or provide additional context, for the courts’ rationale 
when it suspended a conventional application of the fair use doctrine in recognition of HathiTrust’s 
“invaluable contribution to the advancement of knowledge” (Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 2014, p. 93 
quoting Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 2012, p. 460-464). In addition, it could help ameliorate the concerns 
previously raised around scalability (where a fair use defense may be less likely to succeed) and the 
application of other, non-copyright, laws (where fair use would not be available as a defense).  An 
expanded and more fully developed theory of innovative deviance could assist courts in reasoning 
through future cases and articulating clear bases for decisions arising at the intersection of new 
technological and emerging copyright-related behavior. 
The innovative deviance framework might also provide guidance to lawmakers as they continue 
to contemplate reforms to existing copyright law.  If copyright law is miscalibrated with respect to 
technological change and this has resulted in an imbalance or mismatch in copyright’s means-end 
formulation then, according to Merton’s theory, deviance is an unavoidable consequence.  The structural 
inequalities in copyright law made manifest by significant changes in information technology effectively 
push members of society toward infringement.  The best response then for lawmakers, stakeholders, and 
society more generally, at least in the short-term, would be to take a permissive or supportive stance 
toward innovative deviance because, of the four possible paths of deviance articulated by Merton, it is the 
only one that preserves and/or advances the goal of copyright. Innovative deviance, further described by 
Merton as “the creative use of illegitimate means to advance an important legitimate end” (1938, p. 230) 
is, in essence, utilitarian infringement.  Merton’s theory would thus suggest that efforts to reform existing 
copyright laws should, first and foremost, seek to strengthen and support the overriding goals of copyright 
against the other (non-utilitarian) paths of deviance, and secondarily seek to expand the availability of 
legitimate means to accomplish its goal by either reducing the scope and/or reach of the exclusive rights 
(17 U.S.C. §106) or expanding the scope and/or reach of limitations to the exclusive rights (17 U.S.C. 
§§107-112).    
4 Conclusion 
The economist and sociologist Thorstein Veblen wryly remarked, “It is not easy in any given case – 
indeed it is at times impossible until the courts have spoken – to say whether [an activity] is an instance of 
praiseworthy salesmanship or penitentiary offense” (as quoted in Merton, 1957, p. 195).  These lines can 
seem particularly blurred when the behavior at issue accomplishes an important and well-accepted 
societal goal but uses illegitimate or infringing means to do so.  By exploring the ways in which existing 
copyright law and current policy debates intersect with emerging technology-enabled ways of creating, 
organizing, managing, disseminating, and engaging with existing works, this research illustrates that the 
distinction between an “invaluable contribution to the progress of science and cultivation of the arts” and 
copyright infringement is not always self-evident or easy to explain via conventional legal methods.  This 
observation is further supported by an in-depth discussion and analysis of mass digitization in the context 
of the recent HathiTrust litigation and, in particular, the courts’ reliance on existing fair use doctrine to 
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support what may have ultimately been a policy-based decision.  Finally, by drawing upon sociological 
theories on technological change and deviance, this research begins to articulate a theoretical framework 
for re-conceptualizing the interplay between copyright law and technological change.  This research 
suggests that innovative deviance might provides a framework within which existing laws can learn to 
change in step with technological change.  Viewing the phenomenon via this new lens, this research 
hopes to deepen current understandings, enrich existing discourse, and ignite renewed reflection of this 
complex, murky, yet important topic.  
References 
A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009). 
Associated Press. (January 14, 2013). Swartz' death fuels debate over computer crime, USA Today.  
Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445, (S.D.N.Y 2012).   
Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, (2nd Cir. 2014).   
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2nd Cir. 2013).  
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §1030 (2008). 
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§101-1332 (2014). 
Fisher, W. (2001). Theories of intellectual property. New essays in the legal and political theory of 
property, 168(1). 
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass 1841). 
Hobbes, T. & Tuck, R. (1996). Leviathan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2002). 
Leval, P. N. (1990). Toward a fair use standard. 130 Harv. L. Rev. 1105.  
Merges, R. P. (2011). Justifying intellectual property: Harvard University Press. 
Merton, R. K. (1938). Social structure and anomie. American sociological review, 3(5), 672-682.  
Merton, R. K. (1957). Social theory and social structure (Rev. ed.) New York, NY, US: Free Press. 
National Research Council; Committee on the Impact of Copyright Policy on Innovation in the Digital Era; 
Board on Science, T., and Economic Policy; Policy and Global Affairs. (2013). Copyright in the 
Digital Era: Building Evidence for Policy (S. A. Merrill & W. J. Raduchel Eds.): National 
Academies Press. Available at: http://www.nap.edu/catalog/14686/copyright-in-the-digital-era-
building-evidence-for-policy 
Pallante, M. A. (2012(a)). Next Great Copyright Act, The. 36 Colum. JL & Arts 315.  
Pallante, M. A. (2012(b)). Orphan Works & Mass Digitization: Obstacles & Opportunities. 27 Berkeley 
Tech. LJ 1251.  
Patry, W. (2009). Moral panics and the copyright wars: Oxford University Press. 
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). 
Pfohl, S. J. (1994). Images of deviance and social control: A sociological history: McGraw-Hill New York. 
Samuelson, P. (2010). The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 25 Berkeley Tech. LJ 
1175.  
Shelley, P. B. (1890). A defense of poetry: Ginn. 
Sony Comp. Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000).  
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
Statute of Anne, or An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in 
the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein mentioned, 8 Anne, ch. 19 
(1710). 
U.S. Copyright Office (2011) Legal Issues in Mass Digitization: A Preliminary Analysis and Discussion 
Document. Available at United States Copyright Office Web site: 
http://copyright.gov/docs/massdigitization/  
U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
U.S. Department of Commerce Internet Policy Task Force. (2013) Copyright Policy, Creativity, and 
Innovation in the Digital Economy. Available at United States Patent and Trademark Office Web 
site: http://www.uspto.gov/ip/global/copyrights/  
University of Michigan-Google cooperative agreement (2004). Available at University of Michigan Library 
Web site: http://www.lib.umich.edu/michigan-digitization-project   
Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F. 2d 731 (2nd Cir. 1991). 
 
 
